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This paper envisages endogenous technical change as resulting from the 
interplay between the economic growth engine, consumption, technology and localization 
patterns. We perform numerical simulations with the recursive dynamic general 
equilibrium model IMACLIM-R to study how modeling induced technical change affects 
costs of CO2 stabilization. IMACLIM-R incorporates innovative specifications about final 
consumption of transportation and energy to represent critical stylized facts such as 
rebound effects and demand induction by infrastructures and equipments. Doing so 
brings to light how induced technical change may not only lower stabilization costs 
thanks to pure technological progress, but also triggers induction of final demand - 
effects critical to both the level of the carbon tax and the costs of policy given a specific 
stabilization target. Finally, we study the sensitivity of total stabilization costs to various 
parameters including both technical assumptions as accelerated turnover of equipments 
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1  Introduction 
 
This paper revisits the comparison between autonomous (ATC) and endogenous 
(ETC) models of technical change from a specific premise: in a model where policy signals 
induce the rate of technical change (through both learning by doing and investments in 
R&D) the behavior of  households’ consumption must necessarily be taken into account. 
This premise is one made in the context of a wider discussion on how to endogenize 
structural changes in economic growth models. The notion that the rate and direction of 
technical progress (in terms of aggregate factor intensity) depend not only on the efficiency 
of physical capital but also on the structure of final households’ demand has been put 
forward by Solow (1990). Economic history has also demonstrated the importance of the 
interplay between these two parameters (Wright, 1990). In this paper, parameters such as 
product differentiation (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1998) in non energy related goods and 
services are not endogenized, and we assume static private and public preferences for end-
use services. But we try and contribute to the discussion of endogenous structural changes 
by explicitly addressing the interplays between the endogenous growth engine, 
decarbonization policies and the transportation dynamics as a critical component of final 
demand. More specifically, we attempt to capture the rebound effects on gasoline demand 
triggered by efficiency gains of vehicles as well as the mobility needs induced by 
infrastructure choices for given consumer preferences. In this way, we attempt to extend the 
concept of ETC to the interplays between innovation, infrastructure and energy 
consumption (Hourcade, 1993). 
To disentangle the many facets of ETC vs. ATC debate, we conduct numerical 
experiments assuming: i) the absence of carbon free gasoline as a backstop by the end of the 
century; ii) no “negative costs potentials” and no carbon sequestration; iii) a linear carbon tax 
profile (hence sub-optimal in all simulations) and iv) no possibility of early retirement of 
capital stocks.  The results from such exercise magnifies effects of the key factors at play (at 
the expense of high GDP losses for meeting tight GHG concentration targets as 450 ppm in 
some policy scenarios)1, with the advantage of delivering some novel insights on the policy 
variables capable of minimizing costs of such ambitious targets. 
This papers is structured as follows. Section two describes the rationale of the 
IMACLIM-R framework and how it describes induced technical change mechanisms (ITC). 
Section three presents the baseline scenario. In section four, we explain why assuming that 
the same overall potentials of technical change may or may not be policy-induced leads to 
very different costs assessments of stabilization scenarios. We pay particular focus on the 
demand induction in transportation as well as on the crowding-out effect of investments. 
Sensitivity tests are performed in the fifth section to enlight the underlying mechanisms. The 







1 Note, however, that some of the assumptions retained for these simulations are far from being implausible. For example, 
the assumption of cheap carbon-free gasoline by the middle of the 21
st century would dampen effects of some of the 
mechanims at play, which may in turn have a critical role in the absence of this optimistic assumption.   3
2  The IMACLIM-R modeling framework 
 
2.1  Structure of the model 
 
IMACLIM-R is a multi-sector multi-region recursive growth model projecting, on a 
yearly basis, the world economy up to 2100. It is run for five regions (the four SRES regions 
– OECD90, REF, ASIA, ALM 2 – from which we set apart the OPEC region), 10 economic 
sectors (coal, crude oil, natural gas, oil products, electricity, construction, composite good, air 
transport, sea transport, terrestrial transport) and two transport modes auto-produced by 
households (personal vehicles and non-motorized transportation). 
The model uses a recursive dynamic framework3 where economic pathways are 
represented through a sequence of static general equilibria, linked by dynamic equations 
(Figure 1). These successive equilibria are computed under the constraints imposed by the 
availability of production factors and inter-sectoral technical relations at each point in time. 
The outcome is a set of values (output levels, price structure, investment) sent to dynamic 
equations which represent population dynamics, fossil fuel resources depletion and technical 
change. Technical change encompasses overall labor productivity and technical coefficients 
and results in a new production frontier used to compute the subsequent equilibrium. In an 
ATC framework, the new parameters of this new production frontier come from exogenous 
trends whereas under ETC assumptions, they come systematically from endogenous 
relations between cumulated investments and technical progress.  
 
This approach was developed in an effort to address four interrelated challenges:   
i) to incorporate some of factors that drive economic growth, rather than defining 
growth rates through entirely exogenous assumptions;  
ii) to utilise in a consistent manner bottom-up expertise about technical change;  
iii) to allow for the description of imperfect foresight (about future relative prices, 
final demand and profitability) and of possible decision routines4 in infrastructure sectors;  
iv) to capture possible transition costs towards long run equilibria, transition costs 
that may result from the interplay between non perfect foresight and the inertia of technical 
systems.  
 
The framework also allows us to a) represent baseline scenarios which can have a 
non-optimal use of production factors (structural unemployment, excess capacity or capacity 
shortages5) and b) to account for the fact that economies adapt to climate targets within the 
constraints imposed by past decisions, including transaction costs of changing domestic 
social contracts. The model incorporates mechanisms driving the economy back to stabilized 
trajectories which are reached if steady long term signals are given to the agents (carbon and 
oil prices) and when the influence of inertia progressively recedes. 
 
2 See (IPCC, SRES, 2000) or http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/149.htm for a full description of these regions. 
3 Similar to the option followed by EPPA (Paltsev et al., 2005 for the last version) or SGM (Edmonds et al., 1993) for 
instance. 
4 The notion of decision routines encompasses here seemingly non optimal choices due to the influence of institutional 
contexts and/or the incorporation of non economic objectives (equity, security) in public decisions. 
5 Picturing non-optimal baselines and policies is important in the context of developing countries since underdevelopment 
is the product of institutional and market failures (for that reason current work at CIRED aims to include public 
indebtedness in long-term simulations). It is also important for developed countries; for example the 4% GDP loss 
predicted in some studies as a cost of Kyoto target for the US relied specifically on the assumption of non-optimal 
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Figure 1 : the recursive dynamic framework of IMACLIM-R 
 
 
In this modeling system, all flows are tracked at each point in time, by a double 
accounting in both money metric values and in physical quantities, the two being linked by 
relative prices6. This hybrid accounting is used to by-pass difficulties linked to the 
representation of capital in usual production functions: at a given point, the model accounts 
for the available physical capacities of production and describes the financial flows serving to 
replace and expand them (see 2.2. herebelow). It is worth noting that, in addition to 
facilitating the tracking of the sources of GHG emissions and of the dipping into fossil fuel 
resources, this methodology facilitates a transparent incorporation through physical technical 
coefficients of bottom-up information regarding (i) the technical saturations of efficiency 
gains in energy and transportation equipments at a given time horizon and (ii) how the 
technical characteristics of energy (and transportation) systems react to relative price 
variations.  
 
2.2  Static equil brium under a given production frontier i  
 
 
Each static equilibrium is Walrasian in nature: it is characterized by annual flows of 
goods and money and a set of relative prices as they results from supply and demand 
behaviors, investment decisions, private and public income budget constraints and clearance 
conditions for international and national markets. The calibration of the static equilibrium at 
the benchmark year (2000) is based on data from the following sources: social accounting 
matrices form the GTAP Database Version 5; IEA/OECD physical database for energy, and 
6 The flows of the five energy goods are expressed in Mtep; final consumption of transportation is indexed in terms of 
passenger-kilometers; housing area is tracked in terms of square-meters built.   5
data from Schäfer and Victor (2000) and the World Road Statistics database for transportation. 
The following is assumed for the current period, in order to solve for subsequent periods:  
 
(i)  Producers  are constrained by fixed capacities (the depreciated sum of previous 
vintages) and the technical characteristics of the equipment stock that result from past 
decisions. This comes to a putty-clay assumption. Hence, the variables of the model are 
prices p, wages w and utilization rate linked to the level of output (UR). Average production 
costs thus derive from fixed input-output coefficients ICj, a fixed labor intensity l, and a static 
diminishing return factor ΩUR which is function of a flexible capacity utilization rate. A 
constant mark-up π is added to the mean cost7. For primary energy sectors, the mark-up 
increases in function of cumulated production, as to capture the scarcity rent on the long-
run. 
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Equation (1) in fact represents the inverse supply curve of each sector, since it shows how the 
representative producer decides its level of ouput Q (Q<Cap) in function of all prices and 
wages. The desired level of ouput in each sector implies a labor demand l·Q. The difference 
between total labor demand across all sectors and the current labor force8 is unemployment. 
The level of unemployement has an impact on real wages through regional wage curves: 
wages tend to infinity as unemployment disappears and they tend to zero as unemployment 
rate tends to one. The calibration of these wage curves rests on Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1995).  
 
(ii) Consumers’ final demand is derived by solving the utility maximization problem for a 
representative consumer : 
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with  ( ) motorized non  cars public air , , , pkm pkm pkm pkm CES Smobility =       (4) 
 
In equation (3), C holds for consumed quantities of composite and construction, S holds for 
services provided by energy and mobility, bn  corresponds to the basic needs of final 
consumers for final goods and services and pkm represents the physical consumption of each 
mode of transportation accounted in terms of passenger-kilometers. 
Note first that energy does not directly enter the utility function; it contributes to 
welfare through the services it fuels. The demand for these services is driven by private 
housing and transportation equipments. Energy consumption is then dependent upon the 
 
7 Such a constant markup corresponds to a profit-maximizing decision of producers when the diminsihing return factor 
follows an exponential function of utilization rate. 
8 Active population follows exogenous trends for each region and incorporate fixed migration flows. These parameters are 
kept constant between the baseline and policy secenarios..    6
efficiency coefficients characterizing the existing stock of end-use equipments. Second, 
transportation modes are nested in a single index of mobility defined by equation (4). To 
account for preferences and spatial heterogeneity of their availability, the different modes of 
transport are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. 
Equation (3) is maximized subject to income and time constraints. Income, defined 
by equation (5) equates the sum of savings, the energy bill (induced by residential needs and 
private transportation) and expenditure on other goods and services (including public 
transportation). Savings follow an exogenous saving rate. The time constraint (6) is derived 
from empirical findings (Zahavi and Talvitie, 1980). and represent average daily travel time 
of a household. For a given travel mode, the marginal consumption of time per kilometer τ 
is an invert correlated to the congestion which, for a given mobility demand, depends on the 
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Ultimately modal shares and mobility demand that result from utility maximization 
depend on both travel costs and travel time productivity of the various modes (average km 
traveled per unit of time). Through this channel, the quantity and cost efficiency of 
infrastructure stocks and the energy efficiency of vehicles have an impact on mobility 
demand, as well as the trade-off between mobility and other goods and services. 
(iii) Investment allocation across regions and sectors is governed by the expectations of 
future profits. Part of the regional savings are reinvested domestically, the rest being 
redirected to an international capital pool, which in turn re-allocates them to regions 
according to the sectors’ profitability. Allocation of investments does not, however, equalize 
the marginal productivity of new investments because investors account for idiosyncratic 
country-risk9. Future profits are imperfectly foreseen, as decision-makers interpret the 
current economic signals as the best available information about present and future 
economic conditions. Sub-sector allocation of investments across technologies are treated in 
the dynamic equations. 
(iv) The equilibrium clears international markets for goods and capital. A conventional 
‘Armington’ specification (Armington, 1969) is adopted for non energy goods though energy 
goods are considered to be homogenous commodities. Their trade rests on specific market 
shares and real physical account of quantities10. Capital and trade balances compensate each 
other, through variations of all regional prices11.  
 
9 ‘Country risks’ represents the aggregate relative economic attractiveness of regions. 
10 Armington specifications do not allow to sum physical quantities that are imported and produced domestically, since they 
are supposed to be different kind of goods. 
11 The variation of regional price index can be interpreted as implicit flexible exchange rates.   7
The existence of short term constraints on the physical capital and technical 
coefficients implies that market clearing is made through modifications to relative prices and 
sectoral level of output. The equilibrium is thus second best and allows for capacity 
shortages, overcapacity and unemployment. The new relative prices impact on profitability 
rates and investment allocation. Inside each region, investments are converted into new 
productive capacities through a regional β-matrix12, which allows for calculating the price of 
a new unit of production capacity for each sector. The over or under-employment of factors 
of production can thus be released across time thanks to these investments and related 
incorporated technical change. 
 
2.3  From static equilibria to growth dynamics:  
 
As pictured in Figure 1, dynamic equations encompass both the evolution of the 
production frontier and movement along this frontier (input-output coefficients, sector-
specific installed capital, public infrastructures, labor force) and of the constraints impinging 
upon the consumers program (income, end-use equipments). They capture the joint effect of 
the macroeconomic growth engine and technical changes on the supply and demand-side. 
The growth engine is composed of (i) exogenous demographic trends (UN estimations 
corrected by migration flows so that populations of low fertility regions are stabilized) (ii) 
labor productivity changes (the labor intensity l in equation (1) and fueled by (i) regional 
saving rates (ii) investments allocation across sectors. Even though they do not affect long-
run growth rates, such as in the Solowian models, short term adjustments condition output 
growth on the short and medium term. Productivity can be assumed either to follow an 
exogenous trend (w/o ITC) or to be driven by cumulated investment in the composite good 
sector (with ITC), accounting for an investment externality on all other sectors. In both cases 
the parameters are calibrated on historic trajectories (Maddison, 1995) and ‘best guess’ of 
long-term trends (Oliveira-Martins et al., 2005). In addition, the β-matrix values are increased 
to account for the part of productivity gains that comes from capital deepening13. 
Technical change at a sector level (intermediate or end-use efficiency gains, costs of new 
technologies and substitutions between energy sources) are driven by the interplay between 
changes in relative prices and cumulated investments. Relative prices operate in the same way 
in both versions of the model by affecting choices of both firms and consumers in 
purchasing new equipments (the resulting new values of their energy and mobility demand 
being captured in the following static equilibrium). The calculation of the production frontier is 
based on a putty-clay assumption which implies that technologies are embodied in the 
equipment stocks resulting from the cumulated investment vintages. In the ‘w/o ITC’ 
version, the diffusion of autonomous technical change is thus constrained by the pace of 
replacement of capital. This creates short run inertia, which is considered realistic for energy, 
transportation and heavy industry sectors. With ITC, this pace is also binding with the 
difference that ‘learning-by-doing’ and R&D mechanisms are also positively correlated to 
cumulated investments. It is thus possible to accelerate the efficiency gains in energy and 
composite sectors (7) and the decrease of investments costs of carbon-free techniques (8). In 
 
12 With βi,j the physical amount of good i that is necessary to build in sector j the capacity to produce one physical unit of 
good j. 
13 The link beween labor productivity gains and capital deepening is calibrated on historical data gathered by (Maddison, 
1995).   8
addition, changes in relative prices of energy induce efficiency improvements in private cars, 
end-use equipments and in the composite sector. 
IMACLIM-R, in some sense, describes such mechanisms through ‘reaction functions’, 
for example, through reduced forms of bottom-up information. It computes the evolution of 
coefficients of the technical input-output matrix, end-use efficiencies (7) and β-matrixes 
coefficients (8) in function of historical investments, as well as variations of relative prices: 
- endogenous variations of energy efficiency of production capacities and equipments: 
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- endogenous variations of investments costs for carbon saving equipments (learning by 
doing and R&D): 
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for any low carbon energy j in country k and any investment good i 
 
Such functions are calibrated on (i) explicit views of technical potentials in the form of 
asymptotes on energy efficiencies and on the shares of given energy carriers in end-use 
demand and energy supply, and (ii) on results from bottom-up models. They incorporate 
technical asymptotes translating expert judgments about the ultimate potentials of each 
technical bundle. In the base case experiment of this exercise we used the following 
estimates14: in the electric sector, the technical asymptotes for energy efficiency are set at 0.5 
for coal-based technologies, 0.6 for oil and gas technologies (these figures do not reflect the 
potential efficiency gains from cogeneration ); the carbon content of energy mix is likely to 
fall to zero. With ITC, the rate of decrease of the price of non-carbon energies doubles when 
investment in those technologies is multiplied by four with respect to the reference case. In 
the composite sector, the rate of global energy efficiency improvement  doubles if the energy 
prices increases by 60%, and the energy mix can be decarbonized up to 100% by 2100. For 
the residential consumption of energy, maximum efficiency gains are -2% per year. For 
transportation, the maximum average efficiency of cars and trucks in 2100 is set at 25% of 
today’s best available techniques. 
 
2.4  Stabilization of CO2 concentrations  
 
To date IMACLIM-R does not include a climate model, then we use total carbon 
budget over the century as a proxy for the stabilization level15. We have checked ex post that 
the emissions trajectories we derived from these carbon budget are consistent with expected 
stabilization, using the carbon cycle and climate module developed at CIRED (Ambrosi et 
al., 2003).  
 
 
14 The estimates we used reproduce orders of magnitude from experts judgments (IEA Investment Oultook, 2004) and from 
output of the POLES energy model. 
15 Since in the 550 ppm scenarios stabilization would occur after 2100, the budget over the 21st century is only a necessary 
condition for stabilization.   9
3  The reference scenario: slow catching-up, carbon intensive development 
patterns 
 
IMACLIM-R is not designed to follow an ex-ante scenario, but rather to produce its 
own reference scenario from a set of upstream assumptions regarding labor productivity 
growth, demography or international trade. To try and calibrate it on the CPI baseline would 
require a cumbersome process of selecting one ad hoc set of parameters.  
On the charts in appendix A, the dotted lines give the trends of the potential growth 
of each region (sum of input assumptions of productivity and population growth) and the 
black line gives the real GDP growth. These curves follow rather similar trends, their 
differences being due to the functioning of the world markets (goods, energy, capital). ASIA 
and REF, after an acceleration of their economic growth in the first part of the century, 
converge to growth rates on the same order of magnitude as OECD, whereas the economic 
growth rate re-accelerates in ALM after 2070 because the catching up of most African 
countries is delayed by comparison with ASIA. At the end of the century the trend towards 
some form of steady growth is interrupted due to the sharp increase of oil prices: the 
transition costs to this new setting explain why the real GDP growth of all regions, OPEC 
excepted, become lower than the sum of input assumptions regarding productivity and 
population.  
This reference case generates 25 GtC of emissions in 2100 and a cumulated 1677 
GtC carbon release over the century. This results from three main components to be borne 
in mind when analyzing the cost of stabilization scenarios. 
a) the increase of households final consumption shows a significant but modest and regionally very 
heterogeneous catching up between 2000 and 2100 (see table in appendix B) : (i) the mean 
annual growth rate of per capita consumption of composite goods is 1.37% in OECD, 1.87 
% in ASIA, 2.67 % for REF, 1.25 % for ALM and 1.63 % for OPEC16; (ii) per capita 
housing space is multiplied by 2.5 in OECD, 4 in ASIA, 6 in REF; (iii) per capita total 
mobility doubles in OECD, triples in ASIA and quadruples in REF. The growth of the 
traffic volume rests on different modal breakdowns across regions: in non-OECD countries 
mobility growth is mainly due to an increasing access to motorized mobility (public modes 
initially, followed by private cars when welfare increases), while OECD experiences a shift to 
air transport. 
b) the decoupling between economic growth and energy demand ranges between 0.66% to 0.98% per 
year depending upon regions. Chart in appendix C displays information about the relative 
role of structural change and energy efficiency gains in this decoupling. For OECD, the 
decoupling comes mostly from the increasing proportion of services in the composite good 
(-0.76% per year against -0.12% for energy efficiency after 2050) while for ASIA, ALM and 
OPEC it comes primarily from energy efficiency gains (-0.5% over the century). This 
translates the fact that, in these regions the ‘dematerialization’ of the economy takes place 
only in the second part of the century. 
c) the aggregate carbon content of the energy supply increases slightly in the first half of the century 
since the electricity supply rests mostly on coal and gas, fuel for transportation is still 
dominantly produced from conventional and non conventional oil. In the second half of the 
 
16 Growth rates of developing countries may appear low compared to current trends. In fact this is a mean growth rate over 
the century, that masks high growth rates during the first half of the century and a generalized slowdown of growth due to 
the combination of a downward convergence of labor productivity growth to a 2% annual rate and of the ageing of 
population, especially in Asia.   10
century fossil fuel prices start rising more significantly, with a “peak oil’ between 2080 and 
2090  17. This triggers more significant penetration of non-fossil energy at the end of the 
century. Thus part of the potential of decarbonization is already included in the baseline, but 
this a minor part. 
 
4  Policy scenarios: why does ITC make a difference ? 
 
Running IMACLIM-R with or without ITC obviously makes a difference for the 
dynamic component of the model. One precondition for comparing the two treatments of 
technical change is to guarantee that they describe identical no-policy baselines and the same 
degree of pessimism or optimism regarding technical change potentials. For the ‘w/o ITC’ 
simulations we switched off all the ‘ITC’ components and we calibrated exogenous technical 
change coefficients to reproduce the same trends of technical change as in the ‘with ITC’ 
baseline. This treatment encompasses all kinds of technical change: general trend of labor 
productivity, energy mix, energy efficiency on supply and demand sides, and costs of 
equipments for non-fossil sources of electricity. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the costs assessment of meeting various CO2 concentration 
targets for OECD and non-OECD regions with a policy based on a carbon tax which 
increases linearly from 2005 to 210018, and the product of which is recycled first by lowering 
preexisting taxes on labor and second with lump-sum transfers to households. In our central 
case, meeting a 550 ppm target requires a 115 $/tC and 384 $/tC carbon tax in 2100 with 
ITC and without ITC respectively. The 450 ppm target requires 365 $/tC and 1166 $/tC 
carbon prices with ITC and without ITC respectively.  
 
  with ITC  without ITC 




+ 3.8 $/ton 
of C/year 




Carbon price in 2100  115 $ per ton 
of C 
365 $ per ton 
of C 
384 $ per ton 
of C 
1166 $ per 
ton of C 
OECD losses in 
Composite consumption  -0.9 %  -3.7 %  -4.6 %  -10.1 % 
Non-OECD losses in 
composite consumption 19  -2.0 %  -5.6 %  -5.6 %  -13.2 % 
Table 1: Costs of CO2 stabilization targets under various technical change 
assumptions (5% discount rate). 
 
 
17 This derives from the cost assessment of conventional and non conventional oil resources provided by the Institut 
Français du Pétrole. It does not mean that there will be no upward pressure on oil prices up to 2080, due to the geopolitical 
tensions triggered by geographical polarization of oil resources, but the shocks cause by these tensions have not been 
incorporated in the baseline utilized in this paper. 
18 A ‘benevolent planner’ should impose a 100-years tax profile very different under with or w/o ITC specifications. We 
did not address this discussion in this paper and used a linear profile in both cases kind in order to concentrate on the 
differences in the economic mechanisms at work with and w/o ITC. 
19 These large losses also encompass larger losses due to lower exports of oil and gas by OPEC and REF regions, which 
deteriorates commercial balance for those regions.   11
The tax levels mentioned above cause significant consumption losses, far higher 
without ITC, than those published in the post-SRES IPCC scenarios (IPCC,2001). This is 
due to conservative assumptions behind our central case; these assumptions are supported 
by the consideration of limits to large scale deployment of renewable energies (bio-fuels), 
concerns about nuclear energy, and the inhibition of investments by uncertainty about the 
ultimate performance of alternative technological routes. The sensitivity analysis conducted 
in Section 5 discusses these assumptions and considers also assumptions that yield lower 
costs. First however, we concentrate on the mechanisms governing the differences in the 
cost assessments delivered with or w/o ITC. 
 
4.1  Lower carbon prices with ITC despite demand induction  
 
In all simulations, the carbon tax triggers a move towards low carbon intensive 
production and consumption through energy switching to cleaner fuels and improved energy 
efficiency. The tax levels required for a given target are determined by the substitution 
possibilities on both the demand and supply sides at each point in time over the course of a 
century. The difference in results with and w/o ITC lies in the dynamics of these 
substitution possibilities. Without ITC, substitution possibilities are moved forward by the 
autonomous progress coefficients of carbon saving techniques and by the turnover of capital 
equipment which limits the pace of penetration of these techniques. The tighter the targets, 
the higher the required carbon price, in order to foster larger substitutions. This hampers 
sectors’ profitability, lowers economic growth, and triggers a vicious circle; reducing the 
replacement rate of equipment in turn slows down the penetration of lower costs carbon 
saving techniques. With ITC, this mechanism is in part offset: the higher the taxes, the 
quicker the decrease of costs of carbon saving techniques and the higher the pace of their 
incorporation in the equipment stock. Moreover, ITC incoporates an additional degree of 
freedom since any increase in energy costs induces some energy efficiency improvements for 
the entire stock of equipment in the composite sectors. In the long term, for a given level of 
carbon tax, the difference in carbon intensity between capital stocks with and w/o ITC is 
substantial. 
However, behind this quantitatively dominant mechanism, more complex dynamics 
are at play in the transportation sector. Table 3 displays results which come as expected for 
the first half of the century: the increase of emissions from transportation is limited to 63% 
with ITC instead of 70% without ITC in a 550 ppm scenario, even for a 2.5 times lower 
carbon tax with ITC. This results from accelerated induced efficiency gains in vehicles. Yet 
these gains are in part offset by a countertendency which is fully revealed after 2050. The 
availability of more efficient transport infrastructures, including roads and the lower user 
cost of private vehicles, induces a higher mobility demand. This modifies the transportation 
breakdown. In the OECD the induced energy efficiency gains partially offset the burden of 
the tax and households reallocate part of their budget to air travel. In non-OECD regions, 
these gains mainly facilitate the access to motorized mobility. After 2050, energy efficiency of 
vehicles reaches an asymptote and the countertendency prevails: in both the 450 and 550 
ppm scenarios with ITC, demand for gazoline still increases while it decreases in scenarios 
without ITC. 
Change in CO2 Emissions 
2000-2050 2050-2100   12
BAU  +245% +5% 
ITC 550, tax=+1.5$/yr  +63% +23% 
ITC 450, tax=+3.8$/yr  -16% +52% 
w/o ITC 550, tax=+4$/yr  +70% -7% 
w/o ITC 450, tax=+12.15$/yr  +2% -7% 
Table 2: Variations of carbon emissions from transportation sector. 
Note: Under ‘BAU’, emissions from transport by 2100 almost return to 2050 levels, due to 
the depletion of oil resources and a sharp increase of fuel prices during this period. 
 
Thus, to the final consumers that face relative cost of higher mobility (a rebound 
effect), price signals are weakened by price-induced efficiency gains in ‘with ITC’ scenarios. 
Morover, since mobility demand causes important infrastructure investments characterized 
by a high inertia, this may create the risks of ‘lock-in’ to carbon-intensive transportation 
systems, putting an increased burden on other sectors (Lecocq et al., 1998). This raises the 
issue of policy instrument choice on shapping transportation dynamics. We come back to 




4.2  From carbon taxes to variations of  economic growth 
 
Aggregate costs of stabilization targets with or without ITC differ in a way which is 
globally consistent with the carbon prices profiles of each scenario: 1.1 % decrease of the 
discounted sum of households’ consumptions of composite goods (a proxy for welfare 
losses) with ITC against 4.8 % without ITC for a 550 ppm target. However a deeper scrutiny 
reveals that the relation between the tax level and the consumption losses are far from being 
linear and homogeneous. First, in both scenarios, losses are higher in non-OECD countries 
(2.0% and 5.6% against 0.9% and 4.6%) despite a consistent carbon tax in both regions. 
Secondly, for a carbon tax 2.66 times lower with ITC than without ITC, consumption losses 
are divided by 5.1 in OECD countries, and by 2.8 in developing countries.  
The quantitative relation between a given level of carbon tax and consumption 
losses results from the interplay between two main channels. First, at any static equilibrium, 
the carbon tax lowers the purchasing power of households and causes a decrease of the 
demand for composite goods. As shown in Table 3, the impact of a given tax level is lower 
with ITC than without ITC because ITC triggers higher energy efficiency gains in end-use 
equipments (residential and vehicles) and a lower carbon content of energy production20.  
 
Scenarios   2050 2100
BAU  +0% +0%
ITC Tax=2,5 / 550ppm  +10% -15%
ITC Tax=3.8 / 450 ppm  +17% +11%
w/o ITC Tax=4 / 550 ppm  +169% +135%
w/o ITC Tax=12.15 / 450ppm  +465% +529%
Table 3: variation of energy costs borne by OECD households w.r.t. the reference 
case. 
 
20 Energy prices are also lower with ITC because of lower demand due to additional energy efficiency gains.   13
Note:  In policy scenarios the rise of oil prices due to resources scarcity is postponed 
compared with the baseline. This counterbalances the impact of the carbon tax on 
households energy bill, and even leads to a net gain in 2100 for a 550 ppm target with ITC. 
 
The same observations hold for variations of the share of energy costs in total 
composite production costs (Table 4). The second channel is the impact of carbon saving 
investments on the overall technical change. Without ITC, lowering investments in the 
composite goods has the simple effect of slowing down the pace of turnover of equipments 
and the extension of production capacities. With ITC on the other hand, the overall 
productivity is also affected, leaving the door open to the crowding out effect observed in 
theoretical models (Smulders, 2003). 
 
Scenarios   2050 2100
BAU  +0% +0%
ITC Tax=2,5 / 550ppm  +63% +0%
ITC Tax=3.8 / 450 ppm  +115% +1%
w/o ITC Tax=4 / 550 ppm  +186% +91%
w/o ITC Tax=12.15 / 450ppm  +397% +126%
Table 4: variation of the share of energy in total production costs of composite goods 
(w.r.t. the reference case). 
 
The magnitude of the slowdown of labor productivity is very low in 550 ppm 
scenarios: from 1.197 to 1.194 % per year for OECD and from 1.92 to 1.90 % per year for 
non-OECD countries. Annual labor productivity growth falls more significantly to 1.16% 
per year and 1.86% per year respectively, but this slowdown is still only responsible for a 
very minor part of total consumption losses (0.3% and 0.6% respectively). This suggests that 
the impact of the crowding-out of investments on growth is far less important than the 
constraints on households budget and sectors’ profitability.  
 
5  Is technological optimism enough to lower costs? 
 
In the simulations above the costs of reaching a stabilization target are contingent 
upon the transitional tensions in energy markets provoked by the carbon tax, affecting final 
consumption, sector profitability and overall labor productivity. Coming back to the question 
that motivates this paper, it now matters to check to what extent such tensions are sensitive 
only to changes in the available set of techniques in the energy sector or also to broader 
structural changes induced by decarbonization policies. 
 
5.1  Sensitivivity tests about technolog cal assumptions  i
 
Three sensitivity tests are conducted the following technological parameters: (i) induced 
energy efficiency gains; (ii) the pace of decrease of the cost of carbon free technologies in the 
electric sector; (iii) the lifetime of production capacities in the electric sector. We present the 
results only for the 550 ppm stabilization scenario ‘with ITC’. 
One unsurprising result is that 20% larger energy efficiency gains in the composite 
sector cut down 16.3 % and 17.1 % of consumption losses for OECD and non-OECD 
respectively. Less intuitive is the fact that increasing by 20% the pace of learning in carbon-
free technologies only reduces consumption losses by 7% and 4.7% in OECD and non-  14
OECD countries respectively. Cheaper carbon-free technologies foster a faster penetration 
of these techniques and thus reduce the tax impact on electricity prices and partly the 
crowding-out effect, but the gain from this more optimistic assumption is inhibited by the 
pace of replacement of production capacities. 
A good indicator of this inertia effect is the carbon content of the composite goods 
displayed in Table 5 for various stabilization targets. Although the carbon content of new 
equipments start declining as soon as 2005 and is drastically cut down in 2100 (between 80% 
and 95% for 550 ppm with ITC) it is remarkable that the average carbon content of the 
production of the composite good is still very high in 2050. At that date the equipment 
stocks is still composed of equipments build in 2020 (for the electric sector). This generates 
an obvious environmental irreversibility: given the cumulated carbon release in the first 
periods, the abatement requirements to meet the carbon targets have to increase sharply by 
the second part of the century. 
 
Scenarios  2050 2100
550 ppm with ITC (tax =1.5)  -29% -56%
450 ppm with ITC (tax =3.8)  -47% -78%
550 ppm without ITC (tax =4)  -33% -61%
450 ppm without ITC (tax =12.15)  -51% -83%
Table 5: variations in the carbon content of composite goods (w.r.t. the reference 
scenario) 
 
The impact of this barrier is fully demonstrated by reducing the lifetime of 
productive capacity in the electric sector by 20%: this allows for 10.0% and 6.7% reductions 
of the consumption losses in OECD and non-OECD respectively. Thanks to lower inertia, 
equipments purchased in the first decades of the century (most of them installed in the DCs) 
are retired more quickly when carbon prices go up, thus reducing the environmental 
irreversibility effect. 
Finally the joint effect of technological optimism and lower inertia will allow fot 























































Figure 2 : Impact of 20% changes in technical parameters 
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5.2  Beyond carbon price only policies, a broader view of structural change 
 
The slowness in curbing down carbon emissions is far more impressive in the 
transportation sector since, in the absence of a carbon free backstop substitute but with 
significant efficiency improvements, neither for the 550 ppm nor for the 450 ppm target 
does the assumption of ITC lead to reductions in emissions from transportation (see Table 
2). This is typically the type of phenomenon that IMACLIM-R  is designed to reveal and 
explain, and which forces to consider the role of induced structural change. 
Let us first examine issues related to freight dynamics. The above simulations 
considered that the transportation content of the production of the composite good was 
sensitive to the transportation prices. But the development of freight ultimately depends on 
the localization patterns of production and consumption, themselves depending on a 
multiplicity of factors beyond transportation costs such as international wages discrepancies, 
industrial specialization and trade-offs between supply security and minimizing stocks 
through ‘just on time’ production. No information is currently available about how drastic 
carbon policies would impact on these parameters. To give the order of magnitude of the 
stake, we considered that non-price determinants may offset the impact of higher 
transportation prices, so that the ‘freight content’ of production remains constant. This 
single modification suffices in increasing the discounted losses for 550 ppm with ITC from 
1.1% to 3%. Without any pretention to realism, this simulation points out a key mechanism 
of a more general interest: even though the share of transportation in total costs is low, 
keeping constant the corresponding i/o coefficients causes a very high increase in mitigation 
costs, due to the fact that once exhausted the bulk of carbon-saving potentials in 
transportation, constraining carbon emissions mechanically amounts to constraining 
economic growth. This is a typical illustration of the interest of an extended dialogue where 
top-down analysis helps detecting issues which are still underworked by sector-based 
analysis. 
Let us now pass to the question of the mobility demand. IMACLIM-R accounts for the 
fact that the development of infrastructures induces additional demand, as it increases the 
time- and cost-efficiency of transportation. In our central case, decisions to build new 
infrastructures rest on the same rationale as for any other production capacities: when 
infrastructures approache saturation, it enhances their expected profitability and triggers 
investments to expand the network. This in turn reinforces the modal shares of road and air 
transportation21. However, infrastructure decisions are, under forms that vary in function of 
their institutional context, a case of private-public partnership in which local authorities give 
authorizations and subsidies to private and public agents, subject to constraints on pricing 
and project specifics. Public authorities, with interests other than energy and climate goals, 
also influence transportation investments indirectly through urban and land-use policies. For 
example, real estate pricing and loan practices are just as important signals as gasoline prices 
for determining the localization choices of households22. This may lead to transportation 
policies driven by the combination of many public concerns and supported by a wider set of 
policy instruments than carbon prices. We illustrate them in an aggregated way through a 
simple decision routine of limiting investments in road infrastructures at a maximum ceiling. 
 
21 A ex post check on transportation trends show that we produce trends with the same order of magnitude as scenarios of 
(WBCSD, 2004) and (Schäffer et Victor, 2000).  
22 For example in France the evolution of average prices of fuels (gasoline, unleaded gasoline, diesel) since 1960 does not 
statistically present a significant upward trend, whereas the price of real estate were multiplied by a factor 3.   16
This has a significant impact on emissions and, for a stabilization at 550 ppm under ITC, the 
required level of the yearly tax increment is $1.2 per ton of carbon with the alternative 
complementary infrastructure policy instead of $1.5 with ‘carbon price only’ policy (Figure 
3)23. Combined with a limitation of investments in both transportation and energy 
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Figure 3: tax-constrained carbon budget under various assumptions 
 
This result demonstrates the interest of accounting for induced changes in 
households’ demand as one of the driver of overall structural change, and of not letting the 
sole carbon price the charge of curbing down emissions from transportation. To go beyond 
this preliminary exercise would imply to incorporate analysis developed in the field of urban 
economics (Fujita, 1991) about the dynamics of lifestyles choice and localization patterns, 
and  to describe better interactions between land-use patterns and the price of real estate.  
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Advocates of modeling technical change as induced by economic signals (Grubb, 
1997) and not purely as an exogenous process argue that, by taking into account the induced 
accelerated innovation process and penetration of new techniques, models using this 
approach yield a more realistic representation of costs of mitigation policies. This paper does 
not pretend to establish what is realistic and what is not. Rather the above comparative 
exercise demonstrates that adopting an endogenous framework induces additional 
complexities, which blurs an univocal view of ITC causing lower policy costs and suggests 
that this causality requires a broader view of policy instruments. 
First, we confirm the intuition that the overall effect of ITC mechanims is to lower 
stabilization costs thanks to the gain from larger efficiency improvements and faster 
penetration of carbon free techniques, which gains are not offset by the crowding-out of 
non-energy investments. The increased energy bill hampers on sector profitability and 
 
23 In the 450 ppm case, the tax increment falls from $3.8 down to $3.0   17
constrains households budget, and the induced technical change reduces more quickly the 
impact on these two parameters. 
Second, sensitivity tests all corroborate the critical role of the interplay between the 
carbon tax, the pace of technical progress on low-carbon technologies and the pace of 
turnover of equipments. The role of inertia in the diffusion of carbon-intensive production 
techniques is magnified in our simulations: (i) the carbon  taxes start low, increases linearly 
and do not exert a strong incentive to decarbonization in the first decades; (ii) imperfect 
foresight of investors about future tax profiles makes them continue to build equipment 
stocks with a non-optimal carbon intensity. This suggests that a major way of reducing 
stabilization costs is to launch credible signals to stabilize the expectations of decision-
makers and to examinate futher the optimal time profile of carbon prices under ITC 
(benefits of accelerated technical change vs. costs of accelerated scrapping of capital stock).   
Third, the role of inertia is aggravated by the rebound effect of energy efficiency in 
the transportation sector and by the induction of mobility demand that offsets part of the 
efficiency gains. Infrastructures built in the following decades will induce carbon intensive 
consumption patterns that are hard to reverse. This is all the more critical in developing 
countries which will build the bulk of these infrastructures in the following decades; there is 
a danger of a lock-in on carbon intensive development patterns that is hard to unlock 
overnight.  
Fourth, the assumption of induced technical change makes the policy context far 
more complex; it forces to diversify policy signals in order to change some key parameters of 
the economic growth engine.Beyond the role of R&D policies, it shows the importance of 
infrastructure policies, of policies affecting the pace of capital stock turnover and of the 
prices of the real estates. 
Finally, in spite of the current limits of our modeling framework, we hope to have 
demonstrated the interest and the possibility of modeling technical change not only as ‘pure’ 
efficiency gains on carbon saving techniques but also as a process of induction of 
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Appendix B: Key Indicators of Development Pathways 
 
   Levels 
Annual growth 
rates 





OECD 8450  20257 32811 1.76% 0.97% 
Non-OECD  307  944 1701  2.27% 1.18% 
ASIA 192 752 1226  2.77% 0.98% 
REF 438  3317 6107  4.13% 1.23% 
ALM 470 852 1633  1.20% 1.31% 
Final 
consumption of 
composite goods    
($1997 per 
capita) 
OPEC 534  1207 2695  1.64% 1.62% 
OECD 1.021 1.561 1.624  0.85% 0.08% 
non-OECD  0.132  0.392 0.410  2.20% 0.09% 
ASIA 0.094  0.377 0.347 2.81% 0.17% 
REF 0.418  1.453 2.004 2.52% 0.64% 
ALM 0.095  0.180 0.181 1.29% 0.01% 
Final 
consumption of 
energy (toe per 
capita) 
OPEC 0.276  0.785 1.152 2.11% 0.77% 
OECD  84%  87% 73%  Ò  Ô 
Non-OECD  85%  94% 84%  Ò  Ô 
ASIA 81%  81% 70%  -  Ô 
REF 88%  92% 88%  Ò  Ô 
ALM 85%  90% 83%  Ò  Ô 
Share of fossil 
fuels in final 
energy 
consumption 
OPEC 86% 92% 83%  Ò  Ô 
OECD 40  59 98  0.79% 1.02% 
non-OECD  10  17 39  1.07% 1.64% 
ASIA 8 14 34  1.00% 1.78% 
REF 13 31 74  1.70% 1.77% 
ALM 11 18 37  0.91% 1.44% 
Stock of building   
(m² per capita) 
OPEC 14  27 59  1.29% 1.56% 
OECD 0.40 0.55 0.73  0.66% 0.56% 
non-OECD  0.03  0.10 0.19  2.50% 1.34% 
ASIA 0.01  0.08 0.17  4.20% 1.37% 
REF 0.11  0.34 0.71  2.26% 1.46% 
ALM 0.04  0.09 0.17  1.41% 1.32% 
Stock of cars per 
capita 
OPEC 0.03 0.08 0.18  2.26% 1.55% 
Oil world price  world 118 132 426  0.22%  2.36% 
Coal -38  -121 -206  - - 
Oil -1032  -3227 -3259  - - 
Gaz -157  -454 -1065  - - 
Et -80  -47 120  - - 
OECD Energy 
net flows 
Exp (+) Imp (-) 
(Mtoe) 
Elec -1  -30 -38  - - 









OECD Net Capital Flows 
Exp (-) Imp (+) 
(billions $1997) 
-29200  -98000 -44000  - - 
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Appendix C:  
Energy - Growth decoupling:










2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
OECD total decoupling OECD structural effect
ASIA total decoupling ASIA structural effect
REF total decoupling REF structural effect 
ALM&OPEC total decoupling ALM&OPEC structural effect
 
  
 
 